In each of the aforementioned cases, trying economic circumstances preceded Privatisation. The circumstances bore implications on access to, and quality of service in all three cases, as well as fiscal implications, as seen with the enormous subsidies in the case of Chile. In all three cases, the governments’ rationale for Privatisation centred around increasing efficiency, reducing fiscal burden, and pursuing the needed investment capital for expansion. All three countries were prudent in ensuring regulatory infrastructure was in place before embarking on Privatisation, so that there would always be a watchdog to ensure equity prevailed, and incentives for efficiency and performance were provided. This regulatory step was in line with the recommendation of both Birdsall and Nellis (2003) and Bayliss (2002). The implementation of these regulatory regimes wasn’t a costless task; in the case of Argentina, it came at a price of US4 million and two years. However, it was a small price to pay in the grand scheme of things.The state’s intention to optimize revenues from the divestitures was evident in all three cases; each country undertook a competitive process to effect the sale.As it pertains to access, again each country ensured that the interest of the poorest wasn’t subordinated to private ownership’s profit interests, through the use of sale contracts. These contracts stipulated specific expansion targets, so as to ensure increased access, moreso to poorer communities. However, the concern of continued rural exclusion to access, as outlined by Birdsall and Nellis (2003), was evident in the Chilean experience.