Overall, it is not only knowledge produced with difficulty that is valued. In the arts, both works produced with ease and difficulty are valid, whereas in the sciences, it is often the simplest theories are often valued the most. Logical induction and valid reasoning is central to knowledge in the natural sciences. Commonly, the simplest theories and experiments can provide this, as they stress fundamental, valid principles and facts which cannot be disproven, such as mathematical knowledge. Even experiments undermining my thesis, such as Fleischmann-Pons, contribute to science through their simplicity. According to Karl Popper’s theorem of falsifiability, disproving a hypothesis is central to the natural sciences. Valuable lessons can be learnt from Fleischmann-Pons, such as the importance of the scientific method. Hence, regardless of its validity, knowledge produced with simplicity is valued in the sciences. Contrarily, in the arts, the production of knowledge is difficult to pinpoint as difficult or simple. Arguably, one could state than any creation of an artwork involves a difficult technique, high reasoning, or specialist sense perception in their eyes. Subsequently, it is both knowledge produced with ease and difficulty that is valued in the arts. However, does this make all art a masterpiece? If I say the creation of an artwork was difficult for me, does this make me an old-master, and put me on the same level as Géricault?The implications of my thesis in terms of the natural sciences is that if knowledge produced with difficulty is valued to a lesser extent, does this diminish knowledge produced with difficulty? Arguably, invalid knowledge produced with difficulty is valued: we learn from mistakes in their extensive, rigorous reasoning or methodology and produce valid knowledge from these improvements. Therefore, even invalid knowledge produced with difficulty should not be entirely discarded. In the arts, stating that both knowledge produced with or without difficulty is valued leaves us with a very broad and inclusive definition of what makes art great. This minimises the role of gatekeepers of knowledge, and leads us to question consensus in the arts. Yet, if ways of knowing- in Pollock’s case intuition, in Géricault’s sense perception- determine the value of art, this implies that art is a way of thinking rather than a form of expression. Furthermore, if, as in Pollock’s case, art is valued due to it breaking previous consensus, this severely undermines the role of consensus. This leads me to wonder if we should question the value of art at all, and if we should instead simply create art for art’s sake.