这个结论，一个物体，或它的质量，不能由它所拥有的关系构成——对安德森的思想哲学有几个有趣的暗示。首先，在他的认识论理论中，它暗示了“意识”——被理解为心智的一种性质和心灵的一种关系——不可能存在。简而言之，没有所谓的“意识”。此外，既然意识是一种关系，那么意识必须是某种精神的其他性质，因为意志或意志也是一种关系，那么它就不可能是精神的必需性质。对于安德森来说，唯一可能意识到或意识到周围事物的心理素质，必须是情感、情感或情感。情感是知道的，是情感的行为。这是安德森的“心灵即感觉”理论。这一观点似乎与我们从弗洛伊德精神分析理论中了解到的至少两个重要事实相一致:首先，意识，而无意识，即睡眠，可以是活跃的，例如，做梦;第二，当意识是有意识的，同时也会有相互冲突的情绪在同时运作，这可以解释诸如口误的心理特征——一种情感是有意识地想说些什么，但另一种情感实际上是说它需要什么。虽然这样的理论看起来像一个现实主义的精神理论，但不幸的是，安德森从来没有发展出一个详细的理论，即情绪构成精神以及它们如何运作。
加拿大哲学论文代写:安德森的思想哲学
This conclusion that an object, or its qualities, cannot be constituted by the relations that it has – had several interesting implications for Anderson’s philosophy of mind. Firstly, in terms of his epistemological theory, it implied that ‘consciousness’ – understood as both a quality of mind and a relation that mind has – cannot exist. There is, in brief, no such thing as ‘consciousness’. Further, since being conscious is a relation, then what is conscious must be some other quality of mind and since volition or will is also a relation, then it cannot be the required quality of mind. For Anderson, the only possible quality of mind that could be aware or conscious of the things around it, had to be emotion, feeling, or affect. It is emotions which know and it is emotions which act. This is Anderson’s theory of ‘mind as feeling’. This view appears to square with at least two important facts we know about the mind from Freudian psychoanalytic theory: firstly, that the mind, while unconscious, that is, asleep, can be active, for example, dreaming; secondly, that while the mind is conscious, there can be conflicting emotions operating at the same time and this can account for such mental features as slips of the tongue – one emotion is conscious in wanting to say something, but another emotion actually says what it needs to. While such a theory appears to be quite suggestive as a Realist theory of mind, it is unfortunate that Anderson never developed a detailed theory of which emotions constitute mind and how they operate.
